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PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION v. PETE PRADO

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 206020 2015-04-14	1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON v. COMELEC REYES, J.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of the free speech clause, but also of the equal protection clause. One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right, which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[42] "Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others."[43]
	GR No. 189793 2010-04-07	SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III v. COMELEC PEREZ, J.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality.[24] Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.[25]
	GR No. 189698 2010-02-22	ELEAZAR P. QUINTO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS PUNO, C.J.
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction.[34] What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.[35] The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,[36] which has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
	GR No. 189698 2009-12-01	ELEAZAR P. QUINTO v. COMELEC NACHURA, J.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.[103] It does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction.[104] What the clause simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.[105] By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.[106]
	GR No. 178413 2008-03-13	AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III v. COMELEC EN BANC SITTING AS NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Equally baseless is Pimentel's averment that his right to equal protection of the laws was violated when the NBC and the SPBOC-Maguindanao adopted a procedure of "no questions" in the canvass of the Maguindanao MCOCs, different from the procedure adopted in the canvass of the certificates of canvass from other provinces/areas. Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that no person shall be denied equal protection of the laws. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.[45] According to Pimentel, he was deprived of equal protection of the laws when he was not allowed to question the election officials involved in the canvass proceedings for Maguindanao, although he was allowed to do so for other provinces or districts. In support of his claim, Pimentel compared his own experiences in the canvass proceedings for different provinces or districts. This Court, however, finds Pimentel's assessment misplaced. What would have been essential for Pimentel to allege and prove was that other senatorial candidates were allowed during the canvass proceedings to question the election officials involved in the preparation and canvassing of the Maguindanao MCOCs and PCOC, while he was not; and that the other senatorial candidates were given undue favor, while he was the only one unjustly discriminated against. It seems apparent to this Court that the position of the SPBOC-Maguindanao and the NBC not to allow, during the canvass proceedings, the questioning of election officials involved in the preparation and canvassing of the Maguindanao MCOCs and PCOC, was consistent for all senatorial candidates. Hence, petitioner was similarly situated with all the other senatorial candidates and they were all treated alike insofar as the canvass proceedings for Maguindanao were concerned.
	GR No. 168056 2005-09-01	CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE VALUE ADDED TAX LAW AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court does not see any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral Conference Committee. In the earlier cases of Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado[29] and Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,[30] the Court recognized the long-standing legislative practice of giving said conference committee ample latitude for compromising differences between the Senate and the House. Thus, in the Tolentino case, it was held that: . . . it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.[31] (Emphasis supplied) B. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI,
	GR No. 148208 2004-12-15	CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS PUNO, J.
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial,[56] but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.