This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2012-11-27 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| As a rule, the withdrawal of a counsel from a case made with the written conformity of the client takes effect once the same is filed with the court. The leading case of Arambulo v. Court of Appeals[80] laid out the rule that, in general, such kind of a withdrawal does not require any further action or approval from the court in order to be effective. In contrast, the norm with respect to withdrawals of counsels without the written conformity of the client is that they only take effect after their approval by the court.[81] | |||||
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2010-10-13 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Under the first sentence of Section 26, the withdrawal of counsel with the conformity of the client is completed once the same is filed in court. No further action thereon by the court is needed other than the mechanical act of the Clerk of Court of entering the name of the new counsel in the docket and of giving written notice thereof to the adverse party.[29] | |||||
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2006-08-16 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| In Arambulo v. Court of Appeals,[20] the therein petitioners argued that since the notice to pay the docket and other fees was served not on their new counsel, but on one who had already withdrawn as their counsel when the case was still with the trial court, the service of such notice on the latter was void and did not bind them, hence, the dismissal of their appeal deprived them of due process. This Court explained. | |||||
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2004-05-20 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| As noted by the IAC in its decision dated May 21, 1984 in AC-G.R. CV No. 5524-UDK, Belen failed to pay the appeal docket fee, not because of lack of interest, but because of lack of proper notice. It was only upon the inquiry of Belen's corroborating counsel that they found out, for the first time, the dismissal of her appeal. The Court is aware of its ruling in Arambulo vs. Court of Appeals[34] that failure of the counsel to inquire from either the trial or the appellate court the status of their appeal particularly as to the payment of docket fees, constitutes negligence sufficient to merit the dismissal of the appeal.[35] However, the fact that the appeal of Belen involved her claim that her own son Carlos de Guia forged her signature in a deed of sale transferring to him the ownership of her two parcels of land, the IAC did not commit any reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the appeal. The interest of substantial justice far outweighs whatever negligence Belen and her counsel might have committed. | |||||