This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2012-11-12 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| The Court notes petitioner's sudden change of thesis in the case. He insisted in his Complaint and in the proceedings before the Provincial Adjudicator, as well as before the DARAB, that the property is a public land and that no one has ever claimed ownership over the same. He maintained that he was in good faith when he cultivated the land because he believed that the land does not belong to anyone. This contention is in stark contrast with his new assertion, raised for the first time in his Motion for Reconsideration before the CA, that he consistently paid rentals to the landowner's caretaker. The belatedness of the factual assertion raises doubts as to its truthfulness. Moreover, his bare assertion is bereft of evidentiary support. He did not name the alleged caretaker or the landowner for whom the caretaker was allegedly collecting rentals. He did not state the quantity of harvests collected as rental or the terms of payment. Given the belatedness[63] and flimsiness of petitioner's factual allegation, the CA cannot be faulted for not accepting it in its assailed Decision and Resolution. | |||||
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2009-06-16 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| On April 12, 2005, the CA reversed the DARAB's ruling and reinstated the PARAD's decision. The CA held that, while the subject property was agricultural, there was no tenancy relationship between the parties, express or implied. The CA concurred in the findings of the PARAD and found no credible evidence to support the contention that petitioners were de jure tenants inasmuch as the elements of consent and sharing were absent. Citing these Court's rulings in Hilario v. Intermediate Appellate Court[38] and Bernas v. Court of Appeals,[39] the CA reiterated that tenancy is not merely a factual relationship but also a legal relationship; hence, the fact that PASUDECO, being the owner of the subject property, was uninvolved in and oblivious to petitioners' cultivation thereof, tenancy relations did not exist. Thus, the CA concluded that in the absence of any tenancy relationship between the parties, the case was outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. | |||||
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2009-03-13 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| We agree with petitioners. Courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue.[16] It is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by, both the pleadings and the evidence, and must be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the pleadings are framed and the case was tried.[17] The courts, in rendering decisions, ought to limit themselves to the issues presented by the parties in their pleadings.[18] A judgment that goes outside of the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties is not only irregular but also extra-judicial and invalid.[19] The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play.[20] | |||||
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2006-09-05 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| While the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70051, limited itself to the issue presented by petitioner, the contrary happened in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895, when the Court of Appeals fell into the same pitfall as the DARAB in fiddling with the issue of security of tenure. This conduct of the DARAB and the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895 cannot be countenanced. First, it goes against the tenet that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue."[14] A judgment that goes outside the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extra-judicial and invalid.[15] This norm does not only apply to courts but also to quasi- judicial bodies such as the DARAB.[16] Prescinding from this rule, the DARAB ruling on security of tenure, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895, is therefore irrregular and invalid. From this disquisition, it is readily clear that the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895 is valid only insofar as it ruled that petitioner can no longer exercise his right to redeem the said property. Res judicata is not applicable because CA-G.R. SP No. 63895, in effect, has no ruling on the issue of security of tenure which CA-G.R. SP No. 70051 could have modified. | |||||
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2005-09-26 |
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| A separate opinion cannot be a proper subject of an appeal.More so in this case where what was appealed in the appellate court was a one-sentence handwritten note of a DARAB member. It is not even the opinion of the DARAB but is merely the personal view of a DARAB member. The appellate court should have dismissed the petition which appealed not the DARAB decision itself but a mere note of a DARAB member which is not part of the DARAB decision. As held in Bernas v. Court of Appeals,[22] "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue and that a judgment going outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate something upon which the parties were not heard is not merely irregular, but extrajudicial and invalid." | |||||
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2005-09-26 |
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| Similarly, in this case, private petitioners should have raised the first two issues during the DARAB proceedings. Matters, theories or arguments not submitted before the DARAB will not be considered on appeal where they are raised for the first time. Well-settled is the rule that a party is not allowed to change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal.[28] | |||||
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2004-04-14 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. We have previously held that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue."[8] A judgment that goes outside the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extra-judicial and invalid.[9] The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play. In the present case, the Court must stick to the issue litigated in the DARAB and in the Court of Appeals, which is whether petitioner has the right to eject the Spouses Velasco from the land under RA 3844. | |||||
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2003-04-29 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| On the other hand, under the express provision of Art. 1649 of the Civil Code, the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. In the case before us, not only is there no stipulation to the contrary; the lessee is expressly prohibited from subleasing or encumbering the land, which includes installing a leasehold tenant thereon since the right to do so is an attribute of ownership. Plainly stated therefore, a contract of civil law lease can prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement. An extensive and correct discussion of the statutory interpretation of Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended, is provided by the minority view in Bernas v. Court of Appeals.[22] | |||||