This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2015-10-20 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Considering the general rule that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA covers only disputes and claims between and among members of the same ICCs/IPs involving their rights under the IPRA, as well as the basic administrative law principle that an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict the provisions of the enabling law,[22] the Court declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-IRR,[23] Rule III, Section 5[24] and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules[25] as null and void insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to include such disputes where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP. As the Court held in Paduran v. DARAB,[26] "[J]urisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or the law and rules of procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law.[27] Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies; rules of procedure cannot.[28] In the abovesaid exceptional cases where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong to the same ICC/IP, however, Rule IV, Section 14 of the NCIP Rules validly dispenses with the requirement of certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the failed attempt to settle the dispute according to the customary laws of the concerned ICC/IP. | |||||
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2015-10-20 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| I share Justice Vitug's view. Laws must be published before they take effect. The publication of all laws "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandatory.[36] Without publication, non-ICCs/IPs would be deprived of due process of law.[37] | |||||
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2014-07-22 |
BRION, J. |
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| Even if we treat the present petition as one for certiorari since it assails the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279, the petition must necessarily fail for failure to show the essential requisites that would warrant the Court's exercise of judicial review. It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the courts will not determine the constitutionality of a law unless the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.[21] | |||||
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2014-02-18 |
ABAD, J. |
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| Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.[7] But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,[8] the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people's computer systems and private documents. | |||||
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2011-12-14 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Likewise, assuming the present petition is one for declaratory relief,[21] as can be gleaned from the caption of the petition, this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction over such a petition. While this Court may treat a petition for declaratory relief as one for prohibition[22] or mandamus, over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction,[23] it must be stressed that this special treatment is undertaken only in cases with far reaching implications and transcendental issues that need to be resolved.[24] | |||||
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2011-06-28 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In Chavez v. PCGG,[24] the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus: | |||||
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2009-09-18 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Finally, we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[36] The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[37] | |||||
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2005-01-17 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Consequently, we cannot sustain the RTC's ruling that Sections 3 (c) (d), 4, 7 and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations are unconstitutional. It is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (1) that the question must be raised by the proper party; (2) that there must be an actual case or controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.[38] | |||||