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ROEL EBRALINAG v. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 205728 2015-01-21	DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC LEONEN, J.
In Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu,[148] students who were members of the religious sect Jehovah's Witnesses were to be expelled from school for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge.[149] In his concurring opinion, Justice Cruz discussed how the salute is a symbolic manner of communication and a valid form of expression.[150] He adds that freedom of speech includes even the right to be silent: Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a symbolic manner of communication that conveys its message as clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it can be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections like those raised in this petition. To impose it on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when their religion bids them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.
	GR No. 205728 2015-01-21	DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC LEONEN, J.
Petitioners erroneously relied on the case of Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu[326] in claiming that the court "emphatically" held that the adherents of a particular religion shall be the ones to determine whether a particular matter shall be considered ecclesiastical in nature.[327] This court in Ebralinag exempted Jehovah's Witnesses from participating in the flag ceremony "out of respect for their religious beliefs, [no matter how] "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others."[328] This court found a balance between the assertion of a religious practice and the compelling necessities of a secular command. It was an early attempt at accommodation of religious beliefs.
	GR No. 203335 2014-02-18	JOSE JESUS M. DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ABAD, J.
There is "actual malice" or malice in fact[41] when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.[42] The reckless disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice.[43]
	AM NO. P-02-1651 2006-06-22	ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR PUNO, J.
To illustrate, in American Bible Society v. City of Manila,[131] the Court granted to plaintiff exemption from a law of general application based on the Free Exercise Clause. In this case, plaintiff was required by an ordinance to secure a mayor's permit and a municipal license as ordinarily required of those engaged in the business of general merchandise under the city's ordinances. Plaintiff argued that this amounted to "religious censorship and restrained the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession, to wit: the distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature to the people of the Philippines." Although the Court categorically held that the questioned ordinances were not applicable to plaintiff as it was not engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit, it also ruled that applying the ordinance to plaintiff and requiring it to secure a license and pay a license fee or tax would impair its free exercise of religious profession and worship and its right of dissemination of religious beliefs "as the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment." The decision states in part, viz: The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. (citations omitted, emphasis supplied) Another case involving mandatory accommodation is Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools.[132] The case involved several Jehovah's Witnesses who were expelled from school for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, in violation of the Administrative Code of 1987. In resolving the religious freedom issue, a unanimous Court overturned an earlier ruling denying such exemption,[133] using the "grave and imminent danger" test, viz: The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom (according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent. Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.[134] (emphases supplied) In these two cases, the Court itself carved out an exemption from a law of general application, on the strength directly of the Free Exercise Clause.
	AM NO. P-02-1651 2006-06-22	ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR PUNO, J.
At the outset, it is worth noting that American jurisprudence in this area has been volatile and fraught with inconsistencies whether within a Court decision or across decisions. For while there is widespread agreement regarding the value of the First Amendment religion clauses, there is an equally broad disagreement as to what these clauses specifically require, permit and forbid. No agreement has been reached by those who have studied the religion clauses as regards its exact meaning and the paucity of records in the U.S. Congress renders it difficult to ascertain its meaning.[27]
	AM No. P-02-1651 2003-08-04	ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR PUNO, J.
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. IV. Old World Antecedents of the American Religion Clauses To understand the life that the religion clauses have taken, it would be well to understand not only its birth in the United States, but its conception in the Old World. One cannot understand, much less intelligently criticize the approaches of the courts and the political branches to religious freedom in the recent past in the United States without a deep appreciation of the roots of these controversies in the ancient and medieval world and in the American experience.[27] This fresh look at the religion clauses is proper in deciding this case of first impression.