This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2014-06-09 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied with.[26] A petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is dismissed outright. This is because a petition for relief from judgment is an exception to the public policy of immutability of final judgments.[27] | |||||
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2014-06-09 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| In Gesulgon v. National Labor Relations Commission,[28] the Labor Arbiter ordered Mariscor Corporation to reinstate Edwin Gesulgon as chief cook on board one of its vessels. Mariscor Corporation had notice of the decision on March 27, 1987, but it did not appeal the Labor Arbiter's decision. Since decisions of Labor Arbiters become final 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision, the decision became final on April 6, 1987. | |||||
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2001-08-15 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| The party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with the two (2) reglementary periods, i.e., the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and, within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is required because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put at last an end to litigation. Because the period fixed is itself devised to meet a condition or contingency (fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect), the equitable remedy is an act of grace, as it were, designed to give the aggrieved party another and final chance, and failure to avail of such chance within the grace period set by statute or the Rules of Court is fatal.[6] | |||||