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HENRY KOA v. CA

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

2015-03-25
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Case law states that when a person assigns his credit to another person, the latter is deemed subrogated to the rights as well as to the obligations of the former.[52] By virtue of the Deed of Assignment, the assignee is deemed subrogated to the rights and obligations of the assignor and is bound by exactly the same conditions as those which bound the assignor.[53] Accordingly, an assignee cannot acquire greater rights than those pertaining to the assignor.[54]  The general rule is that an assignee of a non-negotiable chose in action acquires no greater right than what was possessed by his assignor and simply stands into the shoes of the latter.[55]
2014-09-22
MENDOZA, J.
Well-established is the rule that the assignee is deemed subrogated to the rights as well as to the obligations of the seller/assignor. By virtue of the deed of assignment, the assignee is deemed subrogated to the rights and obligations of the assignor and is bound by exactly the same conditions as those which bound the assignor.[18] What can be inferred from here is the effect on the status of the assignor relative to the relations established by a contract which has been subsequently assigned; that is, the assignor becomes a complete stranger to all the matters that have been conferred to the assignee.
2012-08-23
BERSAMIN, J.
That the attorney's fees granted to the private respondents did not satisfy the foregoing requirement suffices for the Court to undo them.[121] The grant was ineffectual for being contrary to law and public policy, it being clear that the express findings of fact and law were intended to bring the case within the exception and thereby justify the award of the attorney's fees. Devoid of such express findings, the award was a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture.[122]
2009-12-03
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In Koa v. Court of Appeals,[47] we ruled that a warranty is a collateral undertaking and is merely part of a contract. As a collateral undertaking, it follows the principal wherever it goes. When this was pointed out by the Solicitor General, PICOP changed its designation of the 1969 Document from "Presidential Warranty" or "government warranty" in all its pleadings prior to our Decision, to "contract with warranty" in its Motion for Reconsideration. This, however, is belied by the statements in the 29 July 1969 Document, which refers to itself as "this warranty."
2005-01-17
CARPIO, J.
The award of attorney's fees is not proper because AMEC failed to justify satisfactorily its claim for attorney's fees. AMEC did not adduce evidence to warrant the award of attorney's fees.  Moreover, both the trial and appellate courts failed to explicitly state in their respective decisions the rationale for the award of attorney's fees.[49] In Inter-Asia Investment Industries, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[50] we held that:[I]t is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsel's fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit.  The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture.  In all events, the court must explicitly state in the text of the decision, and not only in the decretal portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorney's fees.[51]  (Emphasis supplied)