This case has been cited 10 times or more.
|
2015-06-22 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| As a final note, the Court is wary of the principle that provisions of the POEA-SEC must be applied with liberality in favor of the seafarers, for it is only then that its beneficent provisions can be fully carried into effect.[80] However, on several occasions[81] when disability claims anchored on such contract were based on flimsy grounds and unfounded allegations, the Court never hesitated to deny the same. Claims for compensation based on surmises cannot be allowed; liberal construction is not a license to disregard the evidence on record or to misapply the laws.[82] This Court abides by the principle that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.[83] | |||||
|
2015-06-22 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| It is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment.[27] Indeed, the seafarer has the right to seek the opinion of other doctors under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC but this is on the presumption that the company-designated physician had already issued a final certification as to his fitness or disability and he disagreed with it. | |||||
|
2015-04-20 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| To our mind, such a claim is neither here nor there, and is clearly far from the requirement that a claimant must establish his entitlement to disability benefits under the law by substantial evidence.[20] We cannot overemphasize that "self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case x x x where the quantum of evidence required to establish as fact is substantial evidence."[21] | |||||
|
2014-09-17 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| The Court cannot over-emphasize that "self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case x x x where the quantum of evidence required to establish as fact is substantial evidence."[44] | |||||
|
2013-07-29 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| In several cases, we held that the doctor who have had a personal knowledge of the actual medical condition, having closely, meticulously and regularly monitored and actually treated the seafarer's illness, is more qualified to assess the seafarer's disability.[47] In Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. v. Esguerra,[48] the Court significantly brushed aside the probative weight of the medical certifications of the private physicians, which were based merely on vague diagnosis and general impressions. Similarly in Ruben D. Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency, Inc., et al.,[49] the Court accorded greater weight to the assessments of the company-designated physician and the consulting medical specialist which resulted from an extensive examination, monitoring and treatment of the seafarer's condition, in contrast with the recommendation of the private physician which was "based only on a single medical report x x x [outlining] the alleged findings and medical history x x x obtained after x x x [one examination]."[50] | |||||
|
2012-12-05 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| In Coastal Safeway Marine Services v. Esguerra,[29] we ruled that the foregoing provision means that "it is the company designated-physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment. Concededly, this does not mean that the assessment of said physician is final, binding or conclusive on the claimant, the labor tribunal or the courts. Should he be so minded, the seafarer has the prerogative to request a second opinion and to consult a physician of his choice regarding his ailment or injury, in which case the medical report issued by the latter shall be evaluated by the labor tribunal and the court, based on its inherent merit. For the seaman's claim to prosper, however, it is mandatory that he should be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. Failure to comply with this mandatory reporting requirement without justifiable cause shall result in forfeiture of the right to claim the compensation and disability benefits provided under the POEA-SEC." | |||||
|
2012-10-24 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment.[18] It is his findings and evaluations which should form the basis of the seafarer's disability claim. His assessment, however, is not automatically final, binding or conclusive on the claimant, the labor tribunal or the courts,[19] as its inherent merits would still have to be weighed and duly considered. The seafarer may dispute such assessment by seasonably exercising his prerogative to seek a second opinion and consult a doctor of his choice.[20] In case of disagreement between the findings of the company-designated physician and the seafarer's doctor of choice, the employer and the seaman may agree jointly to refer the latter to a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding on them. | |||||
|
2012-09-05 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| When there is doubt between the evidence submitted by the employer and that submitted by the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the employee.[47] This is consistent with the rule that an employer's cause could only succeed on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the employee's evidence.[48] Thus, MORESCO II cannot rely on the weakness of Ortiz's certification in order to give more credit to its own evidence. Self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are not sufficient where the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact is substantial evidence, described as more than a mere scintilla.[49] "The evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent."[50] MORESCO II has miserably failed to discharge the onus of proving the validity of Cagalawan's transfer. | |||||
|
2012-04-16 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| On the other hand, the medical reports of Dr. Vicaldo and Dr. Caja were issued after petitioner consulted each of them only once. Clearly, said physicians did not have the chance to closely monitor petitioner's illness. Moreover, Dr. Vicaldo's evaluation of petitioner's illness was unsupported by any proof or basis. While he diagnosed petitioner to be suffering from "Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease, Concentric Left Ventricular Hypertrophy, Lateral Wall Ischemic" and suggested an "Impediment Grade V (58-96%)," no justification for such assessment was provided for in the medical certificate he issued. Similarly, Dr. Caja's medical report contained no supporting proof but was rather based on the findings of past examinations done by the company-designated physician, as well as on the statements supplied to her by the petitioner. In Coastal Safety Marine Services Inc. v. Esguerra,[35] this Court brushed aside the medical certifications upon which the seaman therein anchored his claim for disability benefits for being unsupported by diagnostic tests and procedures as would effectively dispute the results of the medical examination earlier made upon him in a foreign clinic referred by his employer. | |||||
|
2011-12-14 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| The Court reiterated the same ruling in the case of Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. vs. Elmer T. Esguerra,[12] where it was written: For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. | |||||