This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2015-06-22 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by Carl. That is apparently not disputed. However, it seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his testimony did not concern the principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime charged but related only to minor and peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the inconsistencies did not negate the positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. Also, that Carl did not shout to seek help upon witnessing how the appellant had stabbed his mother to death did not destroy his credibility. For sure, he could not be expected to act and to react to what happened like an adult. Although children have different levels of intelligence and different degrees of perception, the determination of their capacity to perceive and of their ability to communicate their perception to the courts still pertained to the trial court, because it concerned a factual issue and should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong showing of mistake or misappreciation on the part of the trial court.[18] | |||||
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2014-09-24 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Although the record of the trial is laid bare and open during every appeal in a criminal case, the credibility of witnesses is a factual issue that the Court cannot disturb in this appeal.[5] We reiterate that the findings of fact by the trial court are accorded great respect especially when affirmed on appeal by the CA.[6] This great respect for such findings rests mainly on the trial judge's access to the witnesses while they testify in her presence, giving the trial judge the personal and direct observation of their manner and decorum during intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused, thereby enabling her to see if the witnesses were fidgeting and prevaricating, or were sincere and trustworthy. | |||||
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2009-09-18 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| That IEMELIF has presented sufficient evidence to prove its allegations in its Complaint in Civil Case No. 173711-CV, thus, warranting the ejectment of Juane from the subject property, is a matter which the Court can no longer look into. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts, or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to one another and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation.[13] Time and again we have held that it is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence and credibility of witnesses presented before the lower tribunal or office. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, its findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this Court.[14] Findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court.[15] | |||||
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2003-09-22 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| The time is past for petitioners' arguments. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the second query posed, under the circumstances of this case, is moot and academic. Rule 37, Section 1[14] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides that a motion for new trial should be made "within the period for taking an appeal." Instead, what the record shows is that petitioners, in effect, only asked for a new trial after the appellate court had rendered its decision on appeal. Such a situation is definitely not permissible under the Rules. It is well accepted that a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence may indeed be filed after judgment, but within the period for perfecting an appeal.[15] | |||||
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2002-07-11 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. We see no reason to resolve it anew in the absence of any misappreciation of the facts or any abuse of discretion. Moreover, the same issue, especially whether petitioner had notice of respondent's lien, is a question of fact, not law, hence, not cognizable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In asserting that at the time of his purchase of the land and his subsequent registration of the sale before the Register of Deeds he relied on the face of the title showing that the adverse claim of respondent Llanes had already been cancelled, petitioner is actually inviting us to calibrate the whole evidence anew and consider once again the credibility of witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and as a whole, and the probabilities of the situation,[5] and make another factual determination based thereon - a course of action which is clearly improper given the nature of the instant petition. The Court cannot make any adjudication on the issue of cancellation of adverse claim which petitioner contends effectively cleared the title from any encumbrance. Whether the same had indeed been cancelled, through whose efforts it was facilitated, and the validity of | |||||
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2000-12-15 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts,[6] or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and probabilities of the situation.[7] Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or both questions of law and fact is best left to the appellate court,[8] and all doubts as to the correctness of such conclusions will be resolved in favor of the Court of Appeals.[9] However, in the instant case, we find that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Court of Appeals, hence, we grant the petition. | |||||