This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2015-06-16 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| By the same token, in Colon Heritage v. FDCP, the RTC, Branch 5, in its Decision of September 25, 2012, also ruled against the constitutionality of said Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 for the following reasons: (a) while Congress, through the enactment of RA 9167, may have amended Secs. 140 (a)[8] and 151[9] of the LGC, in the exercise of its plenary power to amend laws, such power must be exercised within constitutional parameters; (b) the assailed provision violates the constitutional directive that taxes should accrue exclusively to the LGU concerned; (c) the Constitution, through its Art. X, Sec. 5,[10] directly conferred LGUs with authority to levy taxes––the power is no longer delegated by the legislature; (d) In CIR v. SM Prime Holdings,[11] the Court ruled that amusement tax on cinema/theater operators or proprietors remain with the LGU, amusement tax, being, by nature, a local tax. The fallo of the questioned judgment reads: | |||||
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2009-12-01 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| However, this argument fails to consider that the second proviso was precisely carved out as an exception to the general rule, in keeping with the principle that appointive officials are prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity and taking part in any election, except to vote.[51] Specific provisions of a particular law should be harmonized not only with the other provisions of the same law, but with the provisions of other existing laws as well.[52] Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus. | |||||
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2005-08-03 |
TINGA, J. |
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| In a similar vein, Southern Cross aptly notes that in instances when it is the DTI Secretary who initiates motu proprio the application for the safeguard measure pursuant to Section 6 of the SMA, respondents' suggested interpretation would result in the awkward situation wherein the DTI Secretary would rule upon his own application after it had been evaluated by the Tariff Commission. Pertinently cited is our ruling in Corona v. Court of Appeals[104] that "no man can be at once a litigant and judge."[105] Certainly, this anomalous situation is avoided if it is the Tariff Commission which is tasked with arriving at the final determination whether the conditions exist to warrant the general safeguard measures. This is the setup provided for by the express provisions of the SMA, and the problem would arise only if we adopt the interpretation urged upon by respondents. | |||||
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2004-07-12 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In Lapid v. Court of Appeals,[12] we held that it is a principle of statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially intended for the said case must prevail. The case on hand involves a disciplinary action against an elective local official. Thus, the Local Government Code is the applicable law and must prevail over the Administrative Code which is of general application.[13] Further, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted much later than the Administrative Code of 1987. In statutory construction, all laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the later law are repealed or modified accordingly.[14] | |||||