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MARIA ELENA MALAGA v. MANUEL R. PENACHOS

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

	GR No. 180882 2013-02-27	BAGUIO REGREENING MOVEMENT v. ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Atty. Masweng ruled that the NCIP has jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) and, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, may issue injunctive writs. According to Atty. Masweng, the allegations in the verified petition show that private respondents invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), when they sought to enjoin petitioners from fencing their ancestral lands within the Busol Watershed Reservation. Petitioners' fencing project violated Section 58 of the IPRA, which requires the prior written consent of the affected ICCs/IPs. The NCIP therefore has authority to hear the petition filed by private respondents and to issue the injunctive writ. As regards petitioners' contention that the issuance of the TRO violated Presidential Decree No. 1818, Atty. Masweng applied the Decision of this Court in Malaga v. Penachos, Jr.,[4] and held that: [R]espondent's project of fencing the Busol Watershed is not in the exercise of administrative discretion involving a very technical matter. This is so since the implementation of the fencing project would traverse along lands occupied by people who claim that they have a legal right over their lands. The fence would actually cut across, divide, or segregate lands occupied by people. The effect of it would fence in and fence out property claims. In this case, petitioners invoke their constitutional rights to be protected against deprivation of property without due process of law and of taking private property without just compensation. Such situations involve pure question of law.[5]
	GR No. 183260 2012-07-04	PHILIPPINE SPORTS COMMISSION v. DEAR JOHN SERVICES MENDOZA, J.
It has been held that the three principles in bidding are the offer to the public, opportunity for competition, and a basis for the exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter which excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive character of the system and thwarts the purpose of its adoption.[25]
	GR No. 183789 2011-08-24	POWER SECTOR ASSETS v. POZZOLANIC PHILIPPINES INCORPORATED PEREZ, J.
It has been held that the three principles in public bidding are: (1) the offer to the public; (2) an opportunity for competition; and (3) a basis for the exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter which excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive character of the system and thwarts the purpose of its adoption.[50]
	GR No. 169914 2009-04-07	ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The three principles of public bidding are: the offer to the public, an opportunity for competition, and a basis for an exact comparison of bids,[16] all of which are present in Sec. 10.9 to Sec. 10.16 of the IRR. First, the project is offered to the public through the publication of the invitation for comparative proposals. Second, the challengers are given the opportunity to compete for the project through the submission of their tender/bid documents. And third, the exact comparison of the bids is ensured by using the same requirements/qualifications/criteria for the original proponent and the challengers, to wit: the proposals of the original proponent[17] and the challengers must all be in accordance with the requirements of the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the project; the original proponent and the challengers are required to post bid bonds equal in amount and form;[18] and the qualifications of the original proponent and the challengers shall be evaluated by the concerned agency/LGU using the same evaluation criteria.[19]
	GR No. 169914 2008-04-18	ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Generally, in the course of processing an unsolicited proposal, the original proponent is treated in much the same way as all other prospective bidders for the proposed infrastructure project. It is required to reformat and resubmit its proposal in accordance with the requirements of the TOR.[22] It must submit a bid bond equal to the amount and in the form required of the challengers.[23] Its qualification shall be evaluated by the concerned agency/LGU, using evaluation criteria in accordance with Rule 5[24] of the IRR, and which shall be the same criteria to be used in the TOR for the challengers.[25] These requirements ensure that the public bidding under Rule 10 of IRR on Unsolicited Proposals still remain in accord with the three principles in public bidding, which are: the offer to the public, an opportunity for competition, and a basis for exact comparison of bids.[26]
	GR NO. 159245 2006-08-31	GV DIVERSIFIED INTERNATIONAL v. CA QUISUMBING, J.
Relying on our rulings in Malaga v. Penachos, Jr.,[10] Genaro R. Reyes Construction, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[11] and Philippine Ports Authority v. Court of Appeals,[12] petitioner takes exception to the application of P.D. No. 1818. First, it points out that what P.D. No. 1818 proscribes is the issuance of preliminary injunction delaying an infrastructure project of the government. Petitioner claims the preliminary injunction issued by the RTC precisely allowed continuation of work on the project.
	GR No. 155001 2003-05-05	DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN v. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO. PUNO, J.
We agree that it is not inconsistent with the rationale and purpose of the BOT Law to allow the project proponent or the winning bidder to obtain financing for the project, especially in this case which involves the construction, operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III. Expectedly, compliance by the project proponent of its undertakings therein would involve a substantial amount of investment. It is therefore inevitable for the awardee of the contract to seek alternate sources of funds to support the project. Be that as it may, this Court maintains that amendments to the contract bidded upon should always conform to the general policy on public bidding if such procedure is to be faithful to its real nature and purpose. By its very nature and characteristic, competitive public bidding aims to protect the public interest by giving the public the best possible advantages through open competition.[45] It has been held that the three principles in public bidding are (1) the offer to the public; (2) opportunity for competition; and (3) a basis for the exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter which excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive character of the system and thwarts the purpose of its adoption.[46] These are the basic parameters which every awardee of a contract bidded out must conform to, requirements of financing and borrowing notwithstanding. Thus, upon a concrete showing that, as in this case, the contract signed by the government and the contract-awardee is an entirely different contract from the contract bidded, courts should not hesitate to strike down said contract in its entirety for violation of public policy on public bidding. A strict adherence on the principles, rules and regulations on public bidding must be sustained if only to preserve the integrity and the faith of the general public on the procedure.
	GR No. 120287 2002-05-28	G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. CA BELLOSILLO, J.
While the rule is that courts may set aside or enjoin the award of a contract made by a government entity, this may be done only upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion[29] or only in cases involving issues definitely outside the exercise of discretion in technical cases and questions of law.[30] We however find nothing of this sort in the allegations of petitioner G & S in Civil Case No. 95-72586. Even if admitted to be true, the allegations do not demonstrate grave abuse of discretion nor raise issues definitely outside the exercise of discretion in technical cases which would survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state cause of action and warrant a trial on the merits of the complaint.
	GR No. 124293 2000-11-20	JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS v. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The word "bidding" in its comprehensive sense means making an offer[37] or an invitation to prospective contractors whereby the government manifests its intention to make proposals[38] for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment for official business or public use,[39] or for public works or repair. The three principles in public bidding are: the offer to the public; an opportunity for competition; and a basis for exact comparison of bids. The distinctive character of the system is destroyed and the purpose of its adoption is thwarted when a regulation thereon excludes any of these principles.[40] Public bidding of government contracts and for the disposition of government assets should have the same principles and objectives. Their only difference, if at all, is that in the public bidding for public contracts, the award is generally given to the lowest bidder while in the disposition of government assets, the award is to the highest bidder.[41] The term "public bidding" imports a sale to the highest bidder with absolute freedom for competitive bidding.[42]