This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2006-08-31 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| On January 19, 1996, Matilde filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of October 19, 1995 which she claimed to have received on January 5, 1996, alleging that 1) petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the first order of dismissal failed to comply with Sections 4 to 6, Rule 15 of the Rules, a) there being no proof of service of copy of the motion to her and her co-defendant, Villalon, b) the motion was not set for hearing on a specified date, and c) no actual hearing on the motion was conducted; and 2) petitioner's subsequent filing of a separate Notice of Hearing on October 27, 1993 was "useless," the 15-day period to assail the first order of dismissal having expired, and the trial court's granting of the motion, without conducting a hearing thereon, was improper. Matilde thus concluded that the actions subsequent to the finality of the first order of dismissal were void, citing Del Castillo v. Aguinaldo.[26] | |||||
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2006-01-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint.[43] In actions for forcible entry, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.[44] To effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.[45] | |||||