Lawyerly

GR No. 195649

2013-04-16

SERENO, C.J.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC[56] that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate's disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

GR No. 196804

2012-10-09

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC

BERSAMIN, J.

On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo submits that the doctrine on the rejection of the second-placer espoused in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections[51] should not apply to him because Ramon's disqualification became final prior to the elections.[52] Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission on Elections,[53] where the Court said: x x x [I]n Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment declaring the candidate's disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case.

GR No. 184935

2009-12-21

DESEDERIO O. MONREAL v. COMELEC

ABAD, J.

disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years. x x x[4] (Emphasis supplied) For his part, respondent Manalili asks that he be allowed to assume the position of Chairman of his barangay in place of petitioner Foronda. Manalili points out that Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[5] which enunciates the doctrine

GR No. 181613

2009-09-11

ROSALINDA A. PENERA v. COMELEC

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Despite the disqualification of Penera, we cannot grant Andanar's prayer to be allowed to assume the position of Mayor of Sta. Monica. The well-established principle is that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.[51]

GR No. 179848

2008-11-27

NESTOR A. JACOT v. ROGEN T. DAL

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest number of votes for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman during the 2007 local elections. The fact that a candidate, who must comply with the election requirements applicable to dual citizens and failed to do so, received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, such requirement.[37] The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly applied. If a person seeks to serve the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.[38] The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.[39]

GR No. 167591

2007-05-09

ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III v. COMELEC

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

In Labo v. Comelec,[8] this Court has ruled that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner, thus:The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

GR No. 167591

2007-05-09

ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III v. COMELEC

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

The substantial compliance rule is defined as "[c]ompliance with the essential requirements, whether of a contract or of a statute."[10] In our jurisdiction, we have applied this rule or principle in numerous issues relative to the scope and application of constitutional and legal provisions. In particular, we applied the rule in criminal cases to comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the charge against him/her as embodied in the Information filed with the court.[11] In other cases, we applied the rule both primarily in compliance with the essential statutory requirements and in liberally construing and applying remedial laws for just and compelling reasons in order to promote the orderly administration of justice.[12] We see no reason why the doctrine of substantial compliance should not be applied to the provisions in question. Indeed, the realization of the laudable goal behind the three (3)-term limit rule is imperative to foil any scheme to monopolize political power and circumvent the proscription against perpetual stay in elective positions. As tersely explained in Borja, Jr.: I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on the continuity or the unbroken service of all of these officials.[13] In Ong and Lonzanida, as in this case, the ruling was that the second condition should be satisfied by the full service of the entire term. Such strict interpretation of the constitutional provision in Sec. 8, Art. X and the provision in Sec. 43 of RA 7160 however does not support and enhance the commendable objective behind the three (3)-term limit but even weakens it. To define service as full service of the entire three (3) years of the term would tolerate, entice, and, in effect, sanction circumvention of the three (3)-term ceiling as not all proclaimed winners are able to fully serve the term. Many proclaimed winners have been ordered to vacate their offices prior to the expiry date of the term and hence, are not effectively covered by Lonzanida and Ong. This situation would become even more prevalent when the newly crafted special rules for election contests take effect on May 15, 2007 in time for the 2007 elections as election contests are required to be decided by the trial courts in six (6) months.[14] Take for example Lonzanida: while the protestant Avez won the case and assumed the elective office, it was only for a paltry couple of months as the position was vacated by Lonzanida only in April of the election year. Consequently, Lonzanida was not credited that term despite practically serving all of it. The fact that prior to his ouster he was elected and served two full terms means that Lonzanida was eligible to run for another three terms after his ouster or disqualification. If Lonzanida were successful for his bid for a three-year term, he would thereafter practically have been in position for 18 consecutive years except for an intervening period of over two months. Indeed, if he were credited the full term although he served only the greater portion of it, he would have been barred by the three (3)-term limit. This position would be more in keeping with the intent of the framers of the Constitution in setting the three (3)-term limit to curtail permanence in office and monopoly of power. Indeed, "[t]he fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it."[15]

GR NO. 163776

2007-04-24

REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC,[22] which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, does not apply to the present case because in Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases[23] because the judgment declaring the candidate's disqualification in Labo and the other cases[24] had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case.

GR Nos. 154796-97

2003-10-23

RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

This Court agrees with the view of the Solicitor General. It is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified.[48] The exception to this well-settled rule was mentioned in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections[49] and reiterated in Grego v. COMELEC.[50] However, the facts warranting the exception to the rule do not obtain in the present case.

GR No. 147589

2003-06-25

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY v. COMELEC

PANGANIBAN, J.

1) Whether Labo v. Comelec,[15] Grego v. Comelec[16] and related cases should be deemed applicable to the determination of winners in party-list elections

	GR No. 195649 2013-04-16	CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMELEC SERENO, C.J.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC[56] that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate's disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
	GR No. 196804 2012-10-09	MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo submits that the doctrine on the rejection of the second-placer espoused in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections[51] should not apply to him because Ramon's disqualification became final prior to the elections.[52] Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission on Elections,[53] where the Court said: x x x [I]n Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment declaring the candidate's disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case.
	GR No. 184935 2009-12-21	DESEDERIO O. MONREAL v. COMELEC ABAD, J.
disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years. x x x[4] (Emphasis supplied) For his part, respondent Manalili asks that he be allowed to assume the position of Chairman of his barangay in place of petitioner Foronda. Manalili points out that Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[5] which enunciates the doctrine
	GR No. 181613 2009-09-11	ROSALINDA A. PENERA v. COMELEC CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Despite the disqualification of Penera, we cannot grant Andanar's prayer to be allowed to assume the position of Mayor of Sta. Monica. The well-established principle is that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.[51]
	GR No. 179848 2008-11-27	NESTOR A. JACOT v. ROGEN T. DAL CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest number of votes for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman during the 2007 local elections. The fact that a candidate, who must comply with the election requirements applicable to dual citizens and failed to do so, received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, such requirement.[37] The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly applied. If a person seeks to serve the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.[38] The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.[39]
	GR No. 167591 2007-05-09	ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III v. COMELEC SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In Labo v. Comelec,[8] this Court has ruled that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner, thus:The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
	GR No. 167591 2007-05-09	ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III v. COMELEC SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The substantial compliance rule is defined as "[c]ompliance with the essential requirements, whether of a contract or of a statute."[10] In our jurisdiction, we have applied this rule or principle in numerous issues relative to the scope and application of constitutional and legal provisions. In particular, we applied the rule in criminal cases to comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the charge against him/her as embodied in the Information filed with the court.[11] In other cases, we applied the rule both primarily in compliance with the essential statutory requirements and in liberally construing and applying remedial laws for just and compelling reasons in order to promote the orderly administration of justice.[12] We see no reason why the doctrine of substantial compliance should not be applied to the provisions in question. Indeed, the realization of the laudable goal behind the three (3)-term limit rule is imperative to foil any scheme to monopolize political power and circumvent the proscription against perpetual stay in elective positions. As tersely explained in Borja, Jr.: I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on the continuity or the unbroken service of all of these officials.[13] In Ong and Lonzanida, as in this case, the ruling was that the second condition should be satisfied by the full service of the entire term. Such strict interpretation of the constitutional provision in Sec. 8, Art. X and the provision in Sec. 43 of RA 7160 however does not support and enhance the commendable objective behind the three (3)-term limit but even weakens it. To define service as full service of the entire three (3) years of the term would tolerate, entice, and, in effect, sanction circumvention of the three (3)-term ceiling as not all proclaimed winners are able to fully serve the term. Many proclaimed winners have been ordered to vacate their offices prior to the expiry date of the term and hence, are not effectively covered by Lonzanida and Ong. This situation would become even more prevalent when the newly crafted special rules for election contests take effect on May 15, 2007 in time for the 2007 elections as election contests are required to be decided by the trial courts in six (6) months.[14] Take for example Lonzanida: while the protestant Avez won the case and assumed the elective office, it was only for a paltry couple of months as the position was vacated by Lonzanida only in April of the election year. Consequently, Lonzanida was not credited that term despite practically serving all of it. The fact that prior to his ouster he was elected and served two full terms means that Lonzanida was eligible to run for another three terms after his ouster or disqualification. If Lonzanida were successful for his bid for a three-year term, he would thereafter practically have been in position for 18 consecutive years except for an intervening period of over two months. Indeed, if he were credited the full term although he served only the greater portion of it, he would have been barred by the three (3)-term limit. This position would be more in keeping with the intent of the framers of the Constitution in setting the three (3)-term limit to curtail permanence in office and monopoly of power. Indeed, "[t]he fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it."[15]
	GR NO. 163776 2007-04-24	REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC,[22] which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, does not apply to the present case because in Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases[23] because the judgment declaring the candidate's disqualification in Labo and the other cases[24] had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case.
	GR Nos. 154796-97 2003-10-23	RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
This Court agrees with the view of the Solicitor General. It is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified.[48] The exception to this well-settled rule was mentioned in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections[49] and reiterated in Grego v. COMELEC.[50] However, the facts warranting the exception to the rule do not obtain in the present case.
	GR No. 147589 2003-06-25	ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY v. COMELEC PANGANIBAN, J.
1) Whether Labo v. Comelec,[15] Grego v. Comelec[16] and related cases should be deemed applicable to the determination of winners in party-list elections

RAMON L. LABO v. COMELEC