This case has been cited 7 times or more.
2011-05-30 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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The presumption that employers are negligent under Article 2180 of the Civil Code flows from the negligence of their employees.[32] Having adjudged that the immediate and proximate cause of the collision resulting in Catubig's death was his own negligence, and there was no fault or negligence on Cabanilla's part, then such presumption of fault or negligence on the part of petitioner, as Cabanilla's employer, does not even arise. Thus, it is not even necessary to delve into the defense of petitioner that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Cabanilla as its employee driver. | |||||
2009-08-28 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.[11] | |||||
2007-01-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.[36] An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case[37] based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. | |||||
2006-12-14 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.[20] (Emphasis supplied) Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final and executory, such judgment has no relevance or importance to this case.[21] It would have been entirely different if respondents' cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.[22] | |||||
2006-11-02 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.[47] In Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company,[48] this Court held that negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.[49] In determining whether or not there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence[50] has laid down the following test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law. | |||||
2003-10-01 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the danger in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.[27] Clearly, the emergency rule is not applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt. Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence. | |||||
2003-06-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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Petitioner further contends that the CA failed to consider that he already relayed his intention to go back to his lane by flashing the pick-up's right signal light. He submits that at that moment Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, had no more reason to swerve to his left. Had Iran not swerved to the left, according to petitioner, the collision would have been avoided. It was Iran who was clearly negligent, says petitioner. Citing our ruling in McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[11] petitioner avers that although his act of occupying the Tamaraw's lane was the initial act in the chain of events, Iran's swerving to the left after petitioner flashed his right turn signal, constituted a sufficient intervening event, which proximately caused the eventual injuries and damages to private complainant. |