This case has been cited 19 times or more.
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2015-08-18 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Fiscal autonomy has been defined as "freedom from outside control."[51] It guarantees full flexibility in the utilization of funds and resources.[52] The Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the judiciary to ensure its independence. As explained in Bengzon v. Drilon:[53] | |||||
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2015-08-18 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Fiscal autonomy has been defined as "freedom from outside control."[51] It guarantees full flexibility in the utilization of funds and resources.[52] The Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the judiciary to ensure its independence. As explained in Bengzon v. Drilon:[53] | |||||
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2015-02-03 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. x x x[23] | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| The entire budget for the judiciary, however, does not only come from the national government. The Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the judiciary to maintain its independence.[61] In Bengzon v. Drilon:[62] | |||||
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2015-01-13 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| In Bengzon v. Drilon,[107] this court said: As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay loans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.[108] | |||||
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2014-07-01 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| In contrast, by allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer funds within their respective offices, the Constitution itself ensures the fiscal autonomy of their offices, and at the same time maintains the separation of powers among the three main branches of the Government. The Court has recognized this, and emphasized so in Bengzon v. Drilon,[133] viz: The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. | |||||
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2014-01-28 |
BRION, J. |
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| In Bengzon v. Drilon,[42] involving the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, we ruled against the interference that the President may bring and maintained that the independence and the flexibility of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman are crucial to our legal system. | |||||
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2013-11-19 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| The 2002[49] PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special provision ordering the release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or local government unit concerned, without further qualifications. The following year, 2003,[50] the same single provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of Public Works and Highways[51] (DPWH) and the DepEd[52] required prior consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects of implementation delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.[53] | |||||
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2013-11-19 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Act 3044,[10] or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered[11] as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post- enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 3[12] provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works projects[13] "shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives." "[T]he committee from each House may [also] authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications."[14] Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section provides that the said secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder." | |||||
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2013-11-19 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| In the 2012[72] and 2013[73] PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "[i]dentification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency [(priority list requirement)] x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list.[74] | |||||
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2012-09-04 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT PETITIONER DEMANDED A BRIBE FROM MENDOZA.[25] | |||||
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2012-07-31 |
PER CURIAM |
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| In Bengzon v. Drilon,[28] we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in the following manner: As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. | |||||
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2011-03-22 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In Social Justice Society,[37] the Court held that, "In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed."[38] In Sabio,[39] the Court held that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is `the basic and paramount law to which x x x all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution.'"[40] In Bengzon v. Drilon,[41] the Court held that, "the three branches of government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution."[42] In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections,[43] the Court held that, "The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to [the Constitution's] commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed."[44] | |||||
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2010-04-23 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In this regard, it is necessary for this Court to elaborate on the nature and meaning of the term "public purpose," in relation to disbursement of public funds. As understood in the traditional sense, public purpose or public use means any purpose or use directly available to the general public as a matter of right. Thus, it has also been defined as "an activity as will serve as benefit to [the] community as a body and which at the same time is directly related function of government."[12] However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere, the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded.[13] In fact, this Court has already categorically stated that the term "public purpose" is not defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern standards. It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only pertain to those purposes that which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform.[14] In short, public use is now equated with public interest,[15] and that it is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons.[16] | |||||
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2010-02-11 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court's independence -- fiscal autonomy.[30] Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees,[31] including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF).[32] The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF[33] expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to "guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy."[34] Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Court's financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Court's fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court's guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence. | |||||
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2009-09-17 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Lest it be overlooked, the decision on whether to proceed with the conversion or defer action thereon until final adjudication of the issue of ownership over the sequestered shares properly pertains to the executive branch, represented by the PCGG. Just as it cannot look into the wisdom behind the enactment of a law, the Court cannot question the wisdom and reasons behind the decision of the executive branch to ask for the conversion of the common shares to preferred shares. Else, the Court would be trenching on the well-settled doctrine of separation of powers. The cardinal postulate explains that the three branches must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies.[17] | |||||
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2006-07-21 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| This Court has already defined the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in the case of Bengzon v. Drilon,[11] as follows - | |||||
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2005-09-30 |
TINGA, J. |
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| other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies.[25] The Court has consistently stressed that "the doctrine of separation of powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit."[26] The concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and between the three departments of the government.[27] Therefore, the implementation of E.O. No. 220 is an executive prerogative while the sourcing of funds to support the CAR's activities is within the province of the legislature. Absent any grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot correct the acts of either the Executive or Congress in respect to the policies concerning the CAR. CONCLUSION | |||||
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2005-05-16 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| This central tenet in a government official's career is more than just a moral imploration. It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so only to enable him to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently.[30] But that does not mean that the public official may dispense with the requirements of the law. The public office is created for the interest and the benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof "is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose."[31] There is a constant need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities. A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity.[32] | |||||