This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2016-02-01 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| AAA, who was then four years old at the time of the molestation, was not expected to be knowledgeable about sexual intercourse and every stage thereof. The fact that she claimed that accused-appellant rubbed his penis against her vagina did not mean that there was no penetration. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman.[21] This explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape.[22] As such, a mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act already constitutes consummated rape.[23] In the present case, AAA testified that she felt pain when accused-appellant "rubbed his penis [against her] vagina."[24] This Court has held that rape is committed on the victim's testimony that she felt pain.[25] In fact, AAA still felt severe pain in her vagina when she was being given a bath by her mother after her molestation.[26] This kind of pain could not have been the result of mere superficial rubbing of accused-appellant's sex organ with that of the victim. Such pain could be nothing but the result of penile penetration sufficient to constitute rape.[27] | |||||
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2014-11-12 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| In this case, the victim, AAA, is intellectually disabled, with a mental age of 6 years and 2 months at 21 years of chronological age and an IQ of 38 at the time of the incident. Her capacity to give consent is only that of a 6-year-and 2-month-old child. She is incapable of giving rational consent to a sexual act. Any sexual intercourse with her, regardless of her relationship with accused and the presence or absence of resistance, is considered rape. In People v. Butiong,[73] this court said: Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual act. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish, one, the sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and, two, the mental retardation of the victim.[74] | |||||
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2014-06-11 |
BRION, J. |
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| In the present case, it is not disputed that AAA was already 17 years old when she was raped. In People v. Butiong,[8] we held that carnal knowledge of a female mental retardate with the mental age below 12 years of age is considered as rape of a woman deprived of reason, thus:It should no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under paragraph 1(b), of Article 266-A, x x x, because the provision refers to a rape of a female "deprived of reason," a phrase that refers to mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation. | |||||
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2013-06-05 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| People v. Cartuano applies only to cases where there is a dearth of medical records to sustain a finding of mental retardation. Indeed, the Court has clarified so in People v. Delos Santos, declaring that the records in People v. Cartuano were wanting in clinical, laboratory, and psychometric support to sustain a finding that the victim had been suffering from mental retardation. It is noted that in People v. Delos Santos, the Court upheld the finding that the victim had been mentally retarded by an examining psychiatrist who had been able to identify the tests administered to the victim and to sufficiently explain the results of the tests to the trial court.[27] (Citations omitted.) | |||||
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2012-12-05 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Equally undeserving of consideration is Estoya's defense of denial and alibi. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the victim with no improper motive to testify falsely against him.[24] In addition, for his defense of alibi to prosper, Estoya must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but he must also satisfactorily establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of commission.[25] On April 5, 2006, at around 3:00 p.m., Estoya claimed to be at his house, which was only around six to seven meters away from BBB's house, where AAA was raped.[26] The very short distance between the two houses does not foreclose the possibility of Estoya's presence at BBB's house at the time of AAA's rape. Lastly, Estoya did not present any evidence to corroborate his alibi. He averred that he spent the day with his nephews and nieces, yet he did not present a single one to support his averment. In the face of AAA's unwavering testimony and very positive and firm identification of Estoya as her assailant, Estoya could no longer hide behind the protective shield of his presumed innocence, but he should have come forward with credible and strong evidence of his lack of authorship of the crime. Considering that the burden of evidence had shifted to Estoya but he did not discharge his burden at all, there is no other outcome except to affirm his guilt beyond reasonable doubt[27] for the crime of simple rape of AAA, under Article 226-A, paragraph (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. | |||||