This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2014-02-18 |
ABAD, J. |
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| In People v. Rodrigueza,[279] this court reiterated the enumeration of the instances when a search and seizure may be conducted reasonably without the necessity of a search warrant:As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government authority. True, in some instances, this Court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion; when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, a search may be validly made even without a search warrant.[280] (Citations omitted) | |||||
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2010-10-20 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Accused-appellants want to convince this Court that their arrest was illegal. As aptly held by the CA, "[a]ppellant's argument that the police officers should have instead secured an arrest warrant is misplaced and untenable considering the nature of the offense involved, the obscurity of the transgressors thereof, and the unpredictability of the transaction subject of the offense." Moreover, this Court has ruled time and again that a buy-bust operation is employed to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto.[22] In fact, there is a fine distinction between entrapping a criminal versus instigating him to commit the crime, to wit: ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.¾While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the `decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a `spotter,' detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary.[23] | |||||
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2006-06-30 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| infirms Josefina's overall credibility.[45] | |||||
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2003-04-04 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In People v. Javar,[39] this Court was clear in pronouncing that any statement obtained in violation of the Constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.[40] In People v. Gomez,[41] citing People v. Rodrigueza,[42] this Court held that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution requires the assistance of counsel to a person under custody even when he waives the right to counsel. | |||||