This case has been cited 2 times or more.
|
2009-02-12 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
||||
| On the matter of accused-appellant's claim of having been denied due process, an examination of the records shows that while accused-appellant was represented by Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyes, who "seems not a lawyer," during the early stages of trial, the latter withdrew her appearance with the conformity of the former as early as July 28, 2000 and subsequently, approved by the RTC in its Order dated August 4, 2000. Thereafter, accused-appellant was represented by Atty. Rainald C. Paggao from the Public Defender's (Attorney's) Office of Makati City. Since the accused-appellant was already represented by a member of the Philippine Bar who principally handled his defense, albeit unsuccessfully, then he cannot now be heard to complain about having been denied of due process.[3] (Underscoring supplied) That appellant's first counsel may not have been a member of the bar does not dent the proven fact that appellant prevented Nelia and company from proceeding to their destination. Further, appellant was afforded competent representation by the Public Attorneys' Office during the presentation by the prosecution of the medico-legal officer and during the presentation of his evidence. People v. Elesterio[4] enlightens:"As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned out later to be a non-lawyer, it is observed that he was chosen by the accused himself and that his representation does not change the fact that Elesterio was undeniably carrying an unlicensed firearm when he was arrested. At any rate, he has since been represented by a member of the Philippine bar, who prepared the petition for habeas corpus and the appellant's brief." (Underscoring supplied) On the third and fourth issues. Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code under which appellant was charged provides: | |||||
|
2007-09-21 |
CORONA, J. |
||||
| The designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. However, the failure to designate the offense by statute,[21] or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act,[22] or an erroneous specification of the law violated[23] does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged.[24] What controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information.[25] In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the information.[26] | |||||