This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2015-01-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Pardon is defined as an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment that the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.[48] | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| This may have partly stemmed from the statement of issues in the 2010 COMELEC Resolution in Pormento defining the issues common to Pormento and Mary Lou Estrada, disregarding the incidents that transpired in the trilogy and the issues that Erap raised in his Answer.[127] Another source of confusion perhaps was the fact that the COMELEC, in ruling on the 2013 Risos-Vidal petition, only cited the Pormento and Mary Lou Estrada cases. | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| That pardon was not an issue specified by the COMELEC when it defined the issues common to petitioners Pormento and Mary Lou Estrada is of no moment since COMELEC only outlined the issues that petitioners Pormento and Mary Lou Estrada commonly shared. The matter of pardon was raised as a defense by Estrada and this was duly noted by the COMELEC in its resolution.[140] Under these circumstances, what assumes importance are the terms of the COMELEC resolution itself which expressly discussed and ruled that the Erap pardon was absolute and had the effect of restoring his right to vote and be voted upon. | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| It must be recalled that Risos-Vidal relies on Section 40[147] of the LGC and Section 12[148] of the OEC, specifically relating to the disqualification ground of a person's conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, in this case, plunder. However, if we are to look closely at these provisions,[149] Erap would not have been disqualified under these provisions because he had already served the 2-year prohibitive period under Section 40 of the LGC.[150] The real main issue of the Risos-Vidal petition is the perpetual absolute disqualification imposed on Erap as an accessory penalty for his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude; and that his pardon did not remit this disqualification. This issue was obviously directly ruled upon by the COMELEC in the 2010 disqualification cases. Hence, applying the same evidence test, there is identity of causes of action between the 2010 and the Risos-Vidal cases. There was likewise identity of subject matters, specifically the qualification of Erap to run for public office in relation to his pardon. | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Doing so serves not only a practical purpose but, more importantly, the greater public interest in not leaving to inference the qualification of a person who is regarded "as more dangerous to society"[152] but stands to gain from the reposition of public trust.[153] It addresses the "presumptive rule that one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to hold public office, as the same partakes of a privilege which the State grants only to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it for the common good."[154] | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Monsanto, in the course of repudiating Cristobal, Pelobello, and Garland, declared that "[t]he better considered cases regard full pardon . . . as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt."[157] | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In contrast, jurisprudence is replete with pardon, working to restore civil and political rights in this wise: "full civil and political rights."[192] A fact noted in one case even seems to indicate that the inclusion of the qualifier "full" is common practice. In that case, the phrase "full civil and political rights" was "written on a standard printed form."[193] | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Thus, if the power to pardon were ever to be invoked, it must remain true to its reason for existence: to correct "infirmities, deficiencies or flaws in the administration of justice;"[212] to "mitigat[e] whatever harshness might be generated by a too strict an application of the law[;]"[213] or to otherwise "temper the gravity of [a punishment's] wrath."[214] To the extent, therefore, that the power to pardon is exercised in a manner that evinces nothing more than the indulgence of caprices, an issue that may properly be taken cognizance of by this court arises: grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In the limited context that excludes the question of Estrada's possible re-incarceration, the materiality of his acceptance is in how such acceptance was imperative in order to bring the pardon to effect. As noted in Monsanto, "[a] pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance."[234] This, too, is reflected in the pardon's text, the last paragraph of which reads:Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take effect.[235] XII | |||||