This case has been cited 21 times or more.
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2013-04-17 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| HTRDC correctly argued that respondents erred in filing the special civil action for certiorari directly with the CA instead of the RTC. In doing so, they violated the time-honored principle of respect for the hierarchy of courts. While this Court, the CA, and the RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari¸ the parties to a suit are not given unbridled freedom to choose between court forums.[29] Judicial hierarchy indicates that "petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the [RTC], and those against the latter, with the [CA]."[30] Therefore, respondents' petition for certiorari was dismissible outright on procedural grounds. | |||||
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2012-08-29 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| In People v. Cuaresma,[23] the Court has also amplified the need for strict adherence to the policy of hierarchy of courts. There, noting "a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land," the Court has cautioned lawyers and litigants against taking a direct resort to the highest tribunal, viz: xxx. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts x x x, which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals x x x, although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it. | |||||
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2011-09-28 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| We also find the necessity to emphasize strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. "A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (`inferior') courts should be filed with the [RTC], and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA). A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition."[40] For the guidance of the petitioner, "[t]his Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive."[41] Its jurisdiction is concurrent with the CA, and with the RTC in proper cases.[42] "However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant upon a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition."[43] Unwarranted demands upon this Court's attention must be prevented to allow time and devotion for pressing matters within its exclusive jurisdiction. | |||||
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2010-05-05 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Further, the petition should be denied for violation of hierarchy of courts as prior recourse should have been made to the Court of Appeals, instead of directly with this Court. A direct invocation of the Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent over-crowding of the Court's docket.[52] As aptly pronounced in Santiago v. Vasquez,[53] the observance of the hierarchy of courts should be respected as the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate court. Thus, | |||||
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2009-07-21 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition.[12] A direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction to issue said writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy - a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.[13] | |||||
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2009-03-20 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Later, we reaffirmed such policy in People v. Cuaresma[23] after noting that there is "a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land." We stressed that - | |||||
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2009-01-19 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Immediately apparent is that the instant petition disregards the hierarchy of courts. While our original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs is not exclusive - it is shared with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the RTC - the choice of where to file the petition for certiorari is not left entirely to the party seeking the writ.[15] The principle of hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for the said petition. A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first-level courts should be filed with the RTC; and those against the latter, with the CA.[16] A direct recourse to this Court is warranted only where there are special and compelling reasons specifically alleged in the petition to justify such action.[17] As a court of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance.[18] This is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent the further over-crowding of the Court's docket.[19] | |||||
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2008-11-18 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The Constitution[62] grants to the Court original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition. Although this original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition (together with petitions for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus) is concurrent with that of the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, the established policy is that this Court allows the direct invocation of its original jurisdiction "if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant,"[63] or "in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy."[64] This policy has been applied by the Court in exceptional cases, among them, People v. Cuaresma,[65] Santiago v. Vasquez,[66] Manalo v. Gloria,[67] Philippine National Bank v. Sayo, Jr.,[68] Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[69] Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,[70] and Government of the United States of America v. Purganan.[71] | |||||
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2008-09-11 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| This Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application therefor will be directed.[11] A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals.[12] The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.[13] | |||||
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2007-08-15 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| Respondents are one in asserting that petitioner circumvents the principle of hierarchy of courts in his petition. Judicial hierarchy was made clear in the case of People v. Cuaresma, thus: There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.[51] x x x The OSG claims that the jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition and mandamus is concurrent with other lower courts like the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals. Respondent NHA argues that the instant petition is misfiled because it does not introduce special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances to warrant direct recourse to this Court and that the lower courts are more equipped for factual issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. Respondents RBI and RHI question the filing of the petition as this Court should not be unduly burdened with "repetitions, invocation of jurisdiction over constitutional questions it had previously resolved and settled." | |||||
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2007-02-14 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Under Rule 65, a special civil action for certiorari lies where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[11] In this case, petitioner failed to allege any circumstance which would show that in issuing the assailed Orders, the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, following the hierarchy of courts, a special civil action for certiorari assailing an order of the Regional Trial Court should be filed with the Court of Appeals and not with this Court.[12] Petitioner did not raise any special reason or compelling circumstance that would justify direct recourse to this Court.[13] | |||||
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2006-11-16 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Lastly, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this petition directly with us. This Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief.[10] We relax this rule only in exceptional and compelling circumstances.[11] This is not the case here. | |||||
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2006-10-12 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN CLEARLY ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE INSTANT CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (RA 3019) ALLEGEDLY ON THE GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.[18] However, on January 7, 2005, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the ground that the proper remedy was to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, conformably with the ruling of this Court in Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman.[19] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, insisting that his petition for certiorari in the CA under Rule 65 was in accordance with the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto.[20] He insisted that the Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial agency of the government, and under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the CA has concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. He asserted that the filing of his petition for certiorari with the CA conformed to the established judicial policy of hierarchy of courts as explained by this Court in People v. Cuaresma.[21] | |||||
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2006-08-31 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Moreover, this petition violates the hierarchy of courts. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with the Court of Appeals.[4] However, the choice of where to file the petition for certiorari is not left to the party seeking the writ. We remind litigants and lawyers to our policy laid down in Vergara v. Suelto,[5] on hierarchy of courts, reiterated in People v. Cuaresma,[6] thus:This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. | |||||
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2006-08-18 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| On the second issue, the rule is that a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify an order of the RTC should be filed in the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.[10] A direct invocation of the original jurisdiction of the Court to issue writs of certiorari may be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[11] This is an established policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon this Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket.[12] | |||||
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2005-06-28 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| At the outset, the Court notes that the petitioner assails an order of dismissal issued by the RTC, with direct recourse to this Court. It must be stressed that in so doing, the petitioner violated an established policy, one that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket.[18] There is, after all, a hierarchy of courts which is determinative of the venue of appeals.[19] This rule may be relaxed only for special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[20] The petitioner should thus have filed its petition first before the Court of Appeals, conformably with this principle of hierarchy of courts. The Court notes that the petitioner failed to satisfactorily explain its failure to comply with or its non-observance of judicial hierarchy. | |||||
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2005-04-12 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.[29] As we stated in People vs. Cuaresma:[30] | |||||
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2004-11-24 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| This same principle was laid down in the case of People v. Cuaresma,[18] where it was held:. . . A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the appellate court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it. | |||||
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2004-01-21 |
DAVIDE JR., CJ. |
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| We have held that this Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. As aptly stated in People v. Cuaresma:[16] | |||||
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2002-09-24 |
BELLOSILLO , J. |
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| We find no exceptional or compelling reason not to observe the hierarchy of courts. Our pronouncement in People v. Cuaresma[14] is most instructive - This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the | |||||
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2002-01-23 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Respondents, in turn, argue that the public respondents merely served as conciliators or mediators, consistent with the mandate of A.O. No. 16 and merely supervised the conduct of the October 3, 1998 referendum during which the PALEA members ratified the agreement. Thus, public respondents did not perform any judicial and quasi-judicial act pertaining to jurisdiction. Furthermore, respondents pray for the dismissal of the petition for violating the "hierarchy of courts" doctrine enunciated in People v. Cuaresma[7] and Enrile v. Salazar.[8] | |||||