This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2015-06-16 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| To be sure, the broad discretion given the appointing power may be limited by the Constitution[135] and by law.[136] Nonetheless, any limitation of the exercise of this broad power is generally strictly construed. Correspondingly, any undue expansion of a textually evident limitation under Section 15, Article VI, would[137] amount to judicial legislation. | |||||
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2011-06-28 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| As shown in PLDT's 2010 GIS,[60] as submitted to the SEC, the par value of PLDT common shares is P5.00 per share, whereas the par value of preferred shares is P10.00 per share. In other words, preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares but cannot elect directors and have only 1/70 of the dividends of common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the preferred shares are owned by Filipinos while foreigners own only a minuscule 0.56% of the preferred shares.[61] Worse, preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT while common shares constitute only 22.15%.[62] This undeniably shows that beneficial interest in PLDT is not with the non-voting preferred shares but with the common shares, blatantly violating the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership in a public utility. | |||||
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2007-09-12 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| This Court deems it proper to apply the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Under this maxim of statutory interpretation, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. If a statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded.[55] Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.[56] Such is the case here. If its intent were otherwise, the law could have so easily and conveniently included "trade union centers" in identifying the labor organizations allowed to charter a chapter or local. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom, and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein.[57] The rule is restrictive in the sense that it proceeds from the premise that the legislating body would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.[58] Expressium facit cessare tacitum.[59] What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted must have been omitted intentionally. | |||||
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2007-05-09 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| The substantial compliance rule is defined as "[c]ompliance with the essential requirements, whether of a contract or of a statute."[10] In our jurisdiction, we have applied this rule or principle in numerous issues relative to the scope and application of constitutional and legal provisions. In particular, we applied the rule in criminal cases to comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the charge against him/her as embodied in the Information filed with the court.[11] In other cases, we applied the rule both primarily in compliance with the essential statutory requirements and in liberally construing and applying remedial laws for just and compelling reasons in order to promote the orderly administration of justice.[12] We see no reason why the doctrine of substantial compliance should not be applied to the provisions in question. Indeed, the realization of the laudable goal behind the three (3)-term limit rule is imperative to foil any scheme to monopolize political power and circumvent the proscription against perpetual stay in elective positions. As tersely explained in Borja, Jr.: I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on the continuity or the unbroken service of all of these officials.[13] In Ong and Lonzanida, as in this case, the ruling was that the second condition should be satisfied by the full service of the entire term. Such strict interpretation of the constitutional provision in Sec. 8, Art. X and the provision in Sec. 43 of RA 7160 however does not support and enhance the commendable objective behind the three (3)-term limit but even weakens it. To define service as full service of the entire three (3) years of the term would tolerate, entice, and, in effect, sanction circumvention of the three (3)-term ceiling as not all proclaimed winners are able to fully serve the term. Many proclaimed winners have been ordered to vacate their offices prior to the expiry date of the term and hence, are not effectively covered by Lonzanida and Ong. This situation would become even more prevalent when the newly crafted special rules for election contests take effect on May 15, 2007 in time for the 2007 elections as election contests are required to be decided by the trial courts in six (6) months.[14] Take for example Lonzanida: while the protestant Avez won the case and assumed the elective office, it was only for a paltry couple of months as the position was vacated by Lonzanida only in April of the election year. Consequently, Lonzanida was not credited that term despite practically serving all of it. The fact that prior to his ouster he was elected and served two full terms means that Lonzanida was eligible to run for another three terms after his ouster or disqualification. If Lonzanida were successful for his bid for a three-year term, he would thereafter practically have been in position for 18 consecutive years except for an intervening period of over two months. Indeed, if he were credited the full term although he served only the greater portion of it, he would have been barred by the three (3)-term limit. This position would be more in keeping with the intent of the framers of the Constitution in setting the three (3)-term limit to curtail permanence in office and monopoly of power. Indeed, "[t]he fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it."[15] | |||||