This case has been cited 5 times or more.
|
2016-01-13 |
REYES, J. |
||||
| On the procedural aspect, OHI admittedly failed to observe the twin notice rule in termination cases. As a rule, the employer is required to furnish the concerned employee two written notices: (1) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; and (2) a written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.[32] In the present case, Lapastora was not informed of the charges against him and was denied the opportunity to disprove the same. He was summarily terminated from employment. | |||||
|
2015-03-18 |
REYES, J. |
||||
| To validly dismiss an employee, the law requires the employer to prove the existence of any of the valid or authorized causes,[24] which, as enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor Code, are: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or the latter's representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.[25] As a supervisorial employee, Farrales is admittedly subject to stricter rules of trust and confidence, and thus pursuant to its management prerogative HPC enjoys a wider latitude of discretion to assess his continuing trustworthiness, than if he were an ordinary rank-and-file employee.[26] HPC therefore insists that only substantial proof of Farrales' guilt for theft is needed to establish the just causes to dismiss him, as the NLRC lengthily asserted in its decision. | |||||
|
2014-01-29 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| Lastly, this Court exculpates petitioners Francisco and How from being jointly and severally liable with GASLI for the illegal dismissal and payment of money claims of herein respondents. In order to hold them liable, it must first be shown by competent proof that they have acted with malice and bad faith in directing the corporate affairs.[77] For want of such proof, Francisco and How should not be held liable for the corporate obligations of GASLI. | |||||
|
2013-03-13 |
REYES, J. |
||||
| Settled is the rule that when supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court.[30] As such, only errors of law are reviewed by the Court in petitions for review of CA decisions. By way of exception, however, the Court will exercise its equity jurisdiction and re-evaluate, review and re-examine the factual findings of the CA when, as in this case, the same are contradicting[31] with the findings of the labor tribunals. | |||||
|
2012-08-29 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| When the CA ruled that the RTC was correct in relying on the abovementioned decisions, it merely recognized the primary jurisdiction of these administrative agencies. It was of the view that the RTC was not correct in the other aspects of the case. Thus, it declared Alegarbes as owner ipso jure of Lot 140 and entitled to retain possession of it. There is no reason for the Court to disturb these findings of the CA as they were supported by substantial evidence, hence, are conclusive and binding upon this Court.[39] | |||||