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REPUBLIC v. RURAL BANK OF KABACAN

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 172352 2015-09-16	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. HABABAG PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
To elucidate, in determining the amount of just compensation for the subject lands, the RTC applied the Income Productivity Approach which approximated the income for the remaining productive life of the crops therein, without considering the fortuitous events and plant diseases, and with the expectation that they would be compensated by developments which could be made by the property owner.[49] The Court has repeatedly ruled that the constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent of the market value of the property, which is, in turn, defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.[50] In this accord, therefore, the Court cannot sustain the formula used by the RTC which was "based on the principle of anticipation which implies that the value of a property is dependent on the potential net benefit that may be derived from its ownership."[51] Clearly, this approach, which is largely characterized by the element of futurity, is inconsistent with the idea of valuing the expropriated property at the time of the taking.
	GR No. 193936 2013-12-11	NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. YCLA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION REYES, J.
In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.[14]
	GR No. 194247 2013-06-19	BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. ROSA REYES PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Second, expropriation cases involve the expenditure of public funds and thus, are matters of public interest. In this light, trial courts are required to be more circumspect in their evaluation of the just compensation to be awarded to the owner of the expropriated property,[45] as in this case.
	GR No. 187677 2013-04-17	REPUBLIC v. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD SERENO, C.J.
We arrived at the same conclusion in Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc.,[28] in which we held thus: The trial court should have been guided by Rule 67, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides thus:
	GR No. 173520 2013-01-30	NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. SPS. RODOLFO ZABALA AND LILIA BAYLON DEL CASTILLO, J.
Just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The word 'just' is used to [qualify] the meaning of the word 'compensation' and to convey thereby the idea that the [amount] to be [t]endered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample."[13] The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is guaranteed no less by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights.[14] As such, no legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts from determining whether the right of the property owners to just compensation has been violated. It is a judicial function that cannot "be usurped by any other branch or official of the government."[15] Thus, we have consistently ruled that statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof.[16] In National Power Corporation v. Bagui,[17] where the same petitioner also invoked the provisions of Section 3A of RA No. 6395, we held that: Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the Court. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.[18] This ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Lubinao,[19] National Power Corporation v. Tuazon[20] and National Power Corporation v. Saludares[21] and continues to be the controlling doctrine. Notably, in all these cases, Napocor likewise argued that it is liable to pay the property owners for the easement of right-of-way only and not the full market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines. But we uniformly held in those cases that since the high-tension electric current passing through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners of the normal use of their land, it is only just and proper to require Napocor to recompense them for the full market value of their property.
	GR No. 171050 2012-07-04	FAR EAST BANK v. TENTMAKERS GROUP MENDOZA, J.
The factual findings of the CA are generally binding on this Court.[22] There are recognized exceptions[23] to this rule. FEBTC, however, has failed to satisfactorily show the applicability of any of those exceptions in this case to warrant a reexamination of the findings.