This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2005-08-29 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| We also agree with the trial court that Simona authorized Mauricio to dispose of the Properties when she executed the GPA. True, Article 1878 requires a special power of attorney for an agent to execute a contract that transfers the ownership of an immovable. However, the Court has clarified that Article 1878 refers to the nature of the authorization, not to its form.[22] Even if a document is titled as a general power of attorney, the requirement of a special power of attorney is met if there is a clear mandate from the principal specifically authorizing the performance of the act.[23] | |||||
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2005-07-29 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| We also agree with the trial court that Simona authorized Mauricio to dispose of the Properties when she executed the GPA. True, Article 1878 requires a special power of attorney for an agent to execute a contract that transfers the ownership of an immovable. However, the Court has clarified that Article 1878 refers to the nature of the authorization, not to its form.[22] Even if a document is titled as a general power of attorney, the requirement of a special power of attorney is met if there is a clear mandate from the principal specifically authorizing the performance of the act.[23] | |||||
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2003-03-26 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Evidently, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the penalty clause in the compromise agreement approved by the court. Even assuming that Atty. Leonardo Cruz exceeded his authority in inserting the penalty clause, the status of the said clause is not void but merely voidable, i.e., capable of being ratified.[17] Indeed, petitioner's failure to question the inclusion of the 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney's fees in the judicial compromise despite several opportunities to do so was tantamount to ratification. Hence, he is estopped from assailing the validity thereof.[18] | |||||
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2001-04-04 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The requirements under both provisions are met when there is a clear mandate expressly given, by the principal to his lawyer specifically authorizing the performance of an act.[27] It has not escaped our attention that in the present case counsel for both parties had no special power of attorney from their clients to enter into a compromise. However, insofar as Teresita was concerned, she was apprised of the agreement and in fact had signed her name as instructed by the court, thereby tacitly ratifying the same. As for accused-appellants, the aforecited dialogue between the court and counsel does not show that they were ever consulted regarding the proposed settlement. In the absence of a special power of attorney given by accused-appellants to their counsel, the latter can neither bind nor compromise his clients' civil liability. Consequently, since Atty. Sanglay and Atty. Rafael had no specific power to compromise the civil liability of all accused-appellants, its approval by the trial court which did not take the precautionary measures to ensure the protection of the right of accused-appellants not to be deprived of their property without due process of law, could not legalize it. For being violative of existing law and jurisprudence, the settlement should not be given force and effect. | |||||