This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2012-10-10 |
REYES, J. |
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| The power to punish for contempt does not, however, render the courts impenetrable to public scrutiny nor does it place them beyond the scope of legitimate criticism. Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers and such right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at judicial authority.[5] It is the cardinal condition of all such criticisms however that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand; and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty to respect courts[6] and therefore warrants the wielding of the power to punish for contempt. | |||||
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2008-08-08 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| As the Court said in In Re: Almacen:[96] | |||||
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2007-07-12 |
PER CURIAM |
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| This Court does not curtail the right of a lawyer, or any person for that matter, to be critical of courts and judges as long as they are made in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels. This Court in In re: Almacen[27] said:Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that is it articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the court's actuation are thrown open to public consumption. x x x | |||||
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2006-07-21 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| That an administrative complaint filed by any person against a lawyer may be acted upon by this Court is settled. In re Almacen[17] explains the raison d'être:. . . [D]isciplinary proceedings [against lawyers] are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2003-03-24 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Respondent's deceitful conduct makes him less than worthy of his continued practice of law. A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity of the legal profession.[26] Commission of grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers.[27] Whenever it is made to appear to the Supreme Court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but the duty of the Court which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar to withdraw the privilege.[28] | |||||