This case has been cited 10 times or more.
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2014-09-30 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The fact that Austria meanwhile reached the compulsory retirement age did not render A.M. No. 2008-23-SC moot, let alone release him from whatever liability he had incurred while in the active service. The jurisdiction acquired by the Court continues despite his compulsory retirement. Indeed, the Court retains its jurisdiction to declare a respondent either innocent or guilty of the charge even in the extreme case of the respondent's supervening death. If innocent, the respondent receives the vindication of his name and integrity by declaring his service in the Government to be well and faithful; if guilty in anyway, he deserves the sanction just and appropriate for his administrative sin.[20] | |||||
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2009-01-29 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Anent respondent Judge's assertion that his optional retirement was effective April 30, 2007, it must be stressed that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent Judge ceases to hold office during the pendency of his case. In Perez vs. Abiera[18] and as reiterated in Judge Rolando G. How vs. Teodora A. Ruiz,[19] this Court ruled:In other words, the jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. x x x If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. | |||||
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2007-11-20 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that cessation from office by reason of resignation,[12] death, or retirement[13] does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative case filed against a public officer while he or she was still in the service, or render the said case academic. The jurisdiction of the disciplining authority attaches at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint and is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. This rule applies to all employees in the civil service,[14] mindful of the constitutional precept that public office is a public trust for which all government employees and officials are accountable to the people. The rationale for this doctrine, as applied to government employees and officials in the judiciary, was explained in Perez v. Abiera[15] in this wise:[T]he jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For, what remedy would the people have against a civil servant who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his last days in office? What would prevent a corrupt and unscrupulous government employee from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune to all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. The retirement of petitioner effective January 1, 1998, did not render moot the instant case. The filing of the administrative complaint against petitioner on December 17, 1997, prior to his retirement, effectively conferred upon the NPC, the CSC, and this Court, the jurisdiction to resolve the case until its conclusion. Hence, the guilt or innocence of petitioner can be validly addressed by the Court in the instant administrative case. | |||||
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2005-05-16 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Anent respondent's retirement on 01 November 2004, it has been settled that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of respondent's case.[11] This was expounded in the case of Perez v. Abiera,[12] cited in the case of Judge Rolando G. How v. Teodora Ruiz, et. al.,[13] thus:[T]he jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. x x x If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. | |||||
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2004-06-03 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Respondent Commission contends that it did not err in upholding the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board since the decision of said Board took into account private respondent's length of service and the fact that it was her first offense. We do not Agree. . . Private respondent's length of service cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance since it was her length of service, among others, that earned her the position she was in and the trust she enjoyed through which she illicitly allowed her relatives to enjoy unmerited privileges and, in the case of Fernando B. Manicad, an unwarranted diploma. (emphasis ours) Moreover, a review of jurisprudence shows that, although in most cases length of service is considered in favor of the respondent,[28] it is not considered where the offense committed is found to be serious.[29] Thus, in Yuson vs. Noel,[30] we ruled:The mere length of his service (for ten years) cannot mitigate the gravity of his offense or the penalty he deserves. It is clear from facts here established that the respondent does not deserve to remain in the Judiciary, where integrity is an indispensable credential. (emphasis ours) And, in Concerned Employee vs. Nuestro,[31] we held: | |||||
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2004-05-27 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Neither respondent's disappearance nor her retirement precludes the Court from holding her liable. Her disappearance constitutes a waiver of her right to present evidence in her behalf. The Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of respondent's case.[8] | |||||
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2004-03-10 |
DAVIDE JR., CJ. |
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| Verily, the resignation of respondent Judge Bellosillo does not render moot and academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court retains its jurisdiction to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications.[13] | |||||
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2003-10-15 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Neither complainant's desistance nor respondent judge's retirement precludes the Court from holding respondent judge liable and imposing on him the penalty of P10,000 fine. A complainant's desistance from an administrative complaint against a member of the bench will not, by itself, warrant the dismissal of the case. [16] This is especially true in the instances where, as in the present case, the respondent judge admits some if not all of the material allegations in the complaint. [17] Similarly, the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. [18] | |||||