This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2007-02-05 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| "x x x But length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence; and as it thus removes from the parties all the immediate means to verify the nature of the original transactions, it operates by way of presumption, in favor of innocence, and against imputation of fraud. It would be unreasonable, after a great length of time, to require exact proof of all the minute circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a satisfactory explanation of every difficulty, real or apparent, with which it may be encumbered. The most that can fairly be expected, in such cases, if the parties are living, from the frailty of memory, and human infirmity, is, that the material facts can be given with certainty to a common intent; and, if the parties are dead, and the cases rest in confidence, and in parol agreements, the most that we can hope is to arrive at probable conjectures, and to substitute general presumptions of law, for exact knowledge. Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the living; for, the legal presumption is the other way; as to the dead, who are not here to answer for themselves, it would be the height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.], 481, 498). Moreover, even if Donata's allegation that she was Maximino's sole heir does constitute fraud, it is insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960,[22] considering the nature of intestate proceedings as being in rem and the disputable presumptions of the regular performance of official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. | |||||
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2007-02-05 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It is not always easy to draw the line of demarcation between a void judgment and a voidable one, but all authorities agree that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is essential to the validity of a judgment and that want of such jurisdiction renders it void and a mere nullity. In the eye of the law it is non-existent. (Fisher vs. Harnden, 1 Paine, 55; Towns vs. Springer, 9 Ga., 130; Mobley vs. Mobley, 9 Ga., 247; Beverly and McBride vs. Burke, 9 Ga., 440; Central Bank of Georgia vs. Gibson, 11 Ga., 453; Johnson vs. Johnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis and Sandoval Coal and Mining Co. vs. Sandoval Coal and Mining Co., 111 Ill., 32; Swiggart vs. Harber, 4 Scam., 364; Miller vs. Snyder, 6 Ind., 1; Seely vs. Reid, 3 Greene [Iowa], 374.)[34] The fraud and misrepresentation fostered by Donata on the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case, namely, the intestate estate of Maximino. Donata's fraud and misrepresentation may have rendered the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, voidable, but not void on its face. Hence, the said Order, which already became final and executory, can only be set aside by direct action to annul and enjoin its enforcement.[35] It cannot be the subject of a collateral attack as is being done in this case. Note that respondents' Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 was one for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of the disputed properties. The annulment sought in the Complaint was not that of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, but of the certificates of title over the properties issued in Donata's name. So until and unless respondents bring a direct action to nullify the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and attain a favorable judgment therein, the assailed Order remains valid and binding. | |||||
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2007-02-05 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It is not always easy to draw the line of demarcation between a void judgment and a voidable one, but all authorities agree that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is essential to the validity of a judgment and that want of such jurisdiction renders it void and a mere nullity. In the eye of the law it is non-existent. (Fisher vs. Harnden, 1 Paine, 55; Towns vs. Springer, 9 Ga., 130; Mobley vs. Mobley, 9 Ga., 247; Beverly and McBride vs. Burke, 9 Ga., 440; Central Bank of Georgia vs. Gibson, 11 Ga., 453; Johnson vs. Johnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis and Sandoval Coal and Mining Co. vs. Sandoval Coal and Mining Co., 111 Ill., 32; Swiggart vs. Harber, 4 Scam., 364; Miller vs. Snyder, 6 Ind., 1; Seely vs. Reid, 3 Greene [Iowa], 374.)[34] The fraud and misrepresentation fostered by Donata on the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case, namely, the intestate estate of Maximino. Donata's fraud and misrepresentation may have rendered the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, voidable, but not void on its face. Hence, the said Order, which already became final and executory, can only be set aside by direct action to annul and enjoin its enforcement.[35] It cannot be the subject of a collateral attack as is being done in this case. Note that respondents' Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 was one for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of the disputed properties. The annulment sought in the Complaint was not that of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, but of the certificates of title over the properties issued in Donata's name. So until and unless respondents bring a direct action to nullify the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and attain a favorable judgment therein, the assailed Order remains valid and binding. | |||||