This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2003-02-07 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but in itself is extremely doubtful.[32] In the present case, accused-appellant's tendency to invoke a melange of defenses renders his testimony dubious. While he admitted the commission of the crime in order to preserve his own life, he maintained that Guban accidentally stabbed himself. This shows ambivalence. Accident presupposes lack of intention to stab the victim, while self- defense presumes voluntariness, induced only by necessity.[33] Indeed, if there is truth to either of his claim, his natural course of action was to assist the victim, or at the very least, report the incident to the authorities. Certainly, the justifying circumstance of self-defense[34] or the exempting circumstance of accident cannot be appreciated considering accused-appellant's flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities of the incident. Furthermore, that he did not surrender the knife to the authorities is inconsistent with a clean conscience and, instead, indicates his culpability of the crime charged.[35] | |||||
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2001-06-29 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the posture of the accused is a mélange of defenses: accident, self-defense and unawareness that a mortal wound had been inflicted upon the victim, each of which are mutually exclusive. Accident presupposes lack of intention to stab the victim, while self-defense presumes voluntariness, induced only by necessity.[24] As to his defense of "accident," according to the prosecution, a person who accidentally injures another does not perceive any aggression that must be repelled by force. A person who says he stabbed another person accidentally or in self-defense cannot at the same time pretend he did not know he had stabbed the other.[25] | |||||