This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2012-04-25 |
SERENO, J. |
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| The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. "What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard."[39] We have said that where a party has been given a chance to be heard with respect to the latter's motion for reconsideration there is sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process.[40] | |||||
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2009-01-20 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected.[50] The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process,[51] for the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or opposition.[52] In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard."[53] In the case at bar, as evident from the Shari'a District Court's order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners' counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Shari'a District Court reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed. | |||||
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2003-09-30 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In De Borja v. Tan,[18] we held that the trial court does not act with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the immediate assumption into office of one who has been appointed as administrator before the perfection of an appeal from the order appointing him as such, where sufficient reasons exist to order execution pending appeal. Section 2, Rule 39[19] of the Rules of Court allow discretionary execution where special reasons or circumstances exist. Here, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of public respondent granting discretionary execution on the ground that the estate of Eufrocina Mackay would be left without an administrator and that the prompt settlement of the estate had already been unduly delayed. As it is the duty of trial courts in which cases are pending for the settlement of estates to expedite the proceedings, and considering further that the trial court is expressly authorized by the Rules of Court to order execution pending appeal, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's actuations. Thus, we find that the Court of Appeals also did not err in affirming the order. | |||||