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DOMINGO T. DIKIT v. RAMON A. YCASIANO

This case has been cited 2 times or more.

2005-05-06
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Under the above provision, there are two entirely distinct and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.[10]
2001-08-16
PARDO, J.
The allegations of the complaint reveal that petitioner's cause of action is for forcible entry with damages.[14] In forcible entry, the deprivation of physical possession of land or building is effected through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.[15] Clearly, respondent Santiago alleged that petitioner "employing guards from the Enriquez Security Agency suddenly entered into possession of the whole 4,398 sq. m. property of defendant Genito, including the portion leased to plaintiff" (respondent Santiago) and that "the entry of defendant Sunny Motors (petitioner) into the leased property and consequent dispossession of plaintiff  thereof is a glaring violation of the latter's rights and interest provided under the lease contract." She still remained in possession of the leased premises but such possession was disrupted following her forcible eviction therefrom.  In her complaint, respondent Santiago was seeking to be restored into possession of the leased premises with damages on account of Genito's breach of her obligation under the lease contract and Sunny Motors Sales, Inc.'s entry to the property through force.[16] In which case, respondent Santiago's cause of action as presented in her complaint is for forcible entry over which the regional trial court has no jurisdiction.[17]