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SALVADOR ARANETA v. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	GR NO. 145742 2005-08-14	PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY v. CIPRES STEVEDORING CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
For the writ to issue, two requisites must be present, namely, the existence of the right to be protected, and that the facts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.[43] It is necessary that one must show an unquestionable right over the premises.[44]
	GR No. 145742 2005-07-14	PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY v. CIPRES STEVEDORING CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
For the writ to issue, two requisites must be present, namely, the existence of the right to be protected, and that the facts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.[43] It is necessary that one must show an unquestionable right over the premises.[44]
	GR No. 143976 2003-04-03	SPS. OSCAR AND HAYDEE BADILLO v. ARTURO G. TAYAG AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC PANGANIBAN, J.
In the present cases, the posting of a supersedeas bond is not necessary to stay the execution of the MTC Order. When a case involves provable rents or damages incurred by a government-owned or controlled corporation, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines. When the State litigates, it is not required to put up a bond for damages or even an appeal bond -- either directly or indirectly through its authorized officers -- because it is presumed to be always solvent.[41]
	GR No. 120287 2002-05-28	G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. CA BELLOSILLO, J.
Be that as it may, we find the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals to be in accord with law and jurisprudence. For starters, it is well settled that before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing by the complainant that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of established right.[43] In the instant case, it is an undisputed fact that the contract of petitioner G & S for coupon taxi service with MIAA had already expired and that a new concessionaire had been chosen. Admittedly there was no existing contractual relationship between MIAA and petitioner G & S since the former was under no legal obligation to renew the concession contract. Consequently petitioner had no right which needed protection by a writ of preliminary injunction.