Lawyerly

You're currently signed in as:
User

NICANOR G. SALAYSAY v. FRED RUIZ CASTRO

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	GR Nos. 179431-32 2010-06-22	LUIS K. LOKIN v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.[39]
	GR No. 189698 2009-12-01	ELEAZAR P. QUINTO v. COMELEC NACHURA, J.
The obvious inequality brought about by the provision on automatic resignation of appointive civil servants must have been the reason why Senator Recto proposed the inclusion of the following during the period of amendments: "ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS COC."[18] The said proviso seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage afflicting appointive officials by considering persons who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the start of the campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit intent that persons holding appointive positions will only be considered as resigned at the start of the campaign period when they are already treated by law as candidates.
	GR No. 127882 2004-01-27	LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION v. VICTOR O. RAMOS CARPIO MORALES, J.
In any case, the constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs with foreign-owned corporations is an exception to the rule that participation in the nation's natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. As Commissioner Villegas emphasized, the provision is "very restrictive."[259] Commissioner Nolledo also remarked that "entering into service contracts is an exception to the rule on protection of natural resources for the interest of the nation and, therefore, being an exception, it should be subject, whenever possible, to stringent rules."[260] Indeed, exceptions should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exception.[261]
	GR No. 125359 2001-09-04	ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO v. CA QUISUMBING, J.
Petitioners correctly point out that Section 10(q) of Circular No. 960 exempts from the reporting requirement foreign currency eligible for deposit under the Philippine Foreign Exchange Currency Deposit System, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6426, as amended. But, in order to avail of the aforesaid exemption, petitioners must show that they fall within its scope. Petitioners must satisfy the requirements for eligibility imposed by Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426.[50] Not only do we find the record bare of any proof to support petitioners' claim of falling within the coverage of Republic Act No. 6426, we likewise find from a reading of Section 2 of the Foreign Currency Deposit Act that said law is inapplicable to the foreign currency accounts in question. Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426 speaks of "deposit with such Philippine banks in good standing, as may...be designated by the Central Bank for the purpose."[51] The criminal cases filed against petitioners for violation of Circular No. 960 involve foreign currency accounts maintained in foreign banks, not Philippine banks. By invoking the confidentiality guarantees provided for by Swiss banking laws, petitioners admit such reports made. The rule is that exceptions are strictly construed and apply only so far as their language fairly warrants, with all doubts being resolved in favor of the general proviso rather than the exception.[52] Hence, petitioners may not claim exemption under Section 10(q).